Foreign Banks in the United States: Acquisitions, Branching, and Other Techniques by Lehr, Dennis J. & MacRae, Cameron F., III
JoumalofComparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation3 (1981)202-224 4
North.Holland Publishing Company
FOREIGN BANKS IN THE UNITED STATES:
Acquisitions, Branching, and Other Techniques
Dennis J. Lehr and Cameron F. MacRae III
MR. MUNDHEIM: The first subject that we want to discuss re-
lates to the entry of foreign banks into the U.S. Dennis Lehr will
start us off on that subject.
1. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN BANKS
MR. LEHR: My presentation will focus heavily on certain
statutory terms whose interpretation is essential and whose history
is not as clear as one might hope. The most interesting issues re-
late to what Congress meant when it propounded the doctrine that we
have come to call "national treatment" or "parity of treatment".
Simple words like "prohibited" are now very actively being consider-
ed in the courts. I mention this because such questions will form
the backdrop of the first three speakers--myself, Cam MacRae, and
Neal Petersen--who will try to cover for you, perhaps with a bit of
overlap, some of the key provisions of the International Banking Act
[hereinafter IBA] [1]. Some of the Act's most important questions
center around the meanings of its terms.
A. Before the International Banking Act
(i) Lack of national policy
Before we get right into the analysis of statutory terms, let
us back up a little and talk about these concepts of "national treat-
ment" and "parity of treatment". The Senate report on the IBA ad-
vanced the proposition that, unlike many other forms of foreign
enterprise doing business in the U.S., foreign banks operating in
this country were not subject to a uniform national policy. This,
in fact, was true because except for those that were federally char-
tered--i.e., national bank subsidiaries--foreign banking organiza-
tions in this country were subject only to state law. This, it was
felt, produced several undesirable consequences.
First, there was a lack of uniform national policy which ham-
pered government efforts in the area of economic and monetary policy.
Many foreign deposit-taking operations were not, for example, subject
to federally imposed reserve requirements. Consequently, the Fed
argued for years that this hampered its ability to control the money
supply and, in turn, its fight to control inflation.
(ii) Competitive inequality
Second, foreign banks often enjoyed, it was felt, competitive
advantages over federally chartered domestic counterparts. The most
notable example of this was the inapplicability of the restrictions
on multiple state branching that apply to U.S. banks.
At this point, let me interrupt myself and mention two names,
as a shorthand, because we are going to be talking about them later.
When we use the expression, "the McFadden Act", we refer to that part
of U.S. banking law that restricts domestic banks from branching
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across state lines. The "Douglas amendment" to the Bank Holding
Company Act has a similar effect and prohibits holding companies
that are presently operating in one state from acquiring subsidiary
banks in another state (2]. But to continue ....
These concerns over the competitive inequality between foreign
and domestic banks operating in this country obviously underlie the
concept of parity of treatment and national treatment. The consi-
derations involving parity of treatment fostered those provisions
of the IBA that now restrict certain interstate expansion opportu-
nities of foreign banks and subject them to reserve requirements,
impose Bank Holding Company Act type restrictions on their non-bank
activities, and subject many of them to the examination, asset
maintenance, reporting, and other obligations to which national
banks are subject.
Less widely known is the fact that the notion of parity of
treatment has also been applied to eliminate or modify statutory
provisions which were considered to be unfair to foreign banks in
their efforts to compete fairly with domestic institutions. For
example--and we will hear more of this later--foreign banks may now
acquire a majority stock interest in an Edge Act corporation and
establish U.S. as well as foreign branches of such Edge Act cor-
porations.
(iii) Options
Again, to help us analyze the thrust of the IBA, let me state
briefly the ground rules applicable to foreign banks prior to the
passage of the IBA. Foreign banking institutions were then conduc-
ting their U.S. operations in one of three forms only: (1) A sub-
sidiary bank could be established with a national charter or under
state law; (2) They could establish a branch or an agency; or (3)
They could operate by means of representative offices.
Subsidiaries and branches ordinarily enjoyed retail deposit-
taking powers. The agencies, of course, could accept only so-called
credit balances. For those who are not initiated, the simplest way
to remember a credit balance is to recall that it is the kind of
account that the holder cannot add to, e.g., by deposit of addition-
al funds. They have been described as active balances that arise
from or are incident to transactions involving loans, funds in tran-
sition, letters of credit, and other identifiable events.
Except in the case of federally chartered subsidiary banks--
and there were not many subsidiaries owned by foreigners--the im-
portant issues of entry control, market expansion, and government
supervision were solely the province of state law. Consequently,
foreign banks were drawn to a handful of states--New York, Illinois,
California--offering attractive banking opportunities and a hospi-
table legal environment. In addition, prior to the passage of the
IBA, the non-banking activities of foreign bank holding companies
were not subject at all to the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act.
B. The International Banking Act of 1978
Five different pieces of legislation were introduced in
Congress during the 1960s to subject foreign banking to overall
federal regulation, but none ever got out of committee. It was not
until the mid-1970s, following the significant rise in foreign bank
operations in the U.S., that there was serious demand for a ration-
alization of foreign bank supervision at the federal level. It was
then that the idea of national treatment and parity of treatment
emerged and--with a helpful push from the OPEC nations and public
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concern in general over foreign ownership of U.S. property and in-
dustry--these concerns were focused in Congress and resulted in the
passage of the IBA. As X have indicated earlier, the IBA has brought
what I would consider sweeping changes in the structure of foreign
banking in the U.S. and I predict that those changes will continue
at an accelerating rate.
(i) Current options
First, the number of forms in which foreign banks operating
here may be conducted has been greatly increased. In addition to
federally or state chartered subsidiary banks and state chartered
branches and agencies (the principal forms of pre-IBA entry) a
foreign bank may now operate in the form of an Edge Act corporation
and may have domestic and foreign branches of such a corporation.
Including commercial lending companies (the IBA's term for Article
12 New York investment companies) the forms of operation available
to foreign banks now number at least ten.
Equally important under the IBA, foreign banks now have the
opportunity of selecting either a federal or a state charter for
branches and agencies and have the option of chartering a branch with
either limited or unlimited deposit-taking ability, further increas-
ing their flexibility.
Let me illustrate this point with three hypotheticals. Let us
take a foreign bank that wishes to establish its initial branch
office with unlimited deposit-taking powers, and that wishes such
branch to be federally chartered. A foreign bank may select any
state in the union in which to locate such a branch, so long as the
Comptroller of the Currency approves the establishment of the for-
eign bank branch and it is not prohibited by state law. Cam MacRae
is going to discuss certain provisions of the Comptroller's regula-
tion that are now being challenged in the courts [3].
Assume that our hypothetical foreign bank already has a retail
deposit-taking branch in one state and wishes to establish another
branch in another state. The foreign bank may do so if the deposit-
taking powers of the second branch are limited to those allowed to
an Edge Act corporation and--if the branch is to be federally char-
tered--its operation is expressly permitted by the law of the state
in which it is to be located. With the exception of this restric-
tion on deposit-taking powers, such a branch would have all of the
banking powers, including fiduciary powers if it asked for them, of
an existing national bank, not foreign owned.
Finally, assume a hypothetical bank wishes to establish a
federally chartered entity of some kind outside its home state that
can accept deposits from persons who are not citizens or residents
of the U.S. Such a bank could seek to establish a federally char-
tered agency. The Comptroller's regulations allow such deposits.
On the other hand, a state chartered agency of a foreign bank cannot
accept such deposits. It can only maintain credit balances. In my
view the Comptroller's regulation permiting a federally chartered
agency to accept such deposits conflicts with a section of the IBA
which prohibits receipt of such deposits.
(ii) Federal controls
As I have already suggested, the IBA establishes a substantial
level of federal control in the areas of foreign bank entry, market
expansion, and regulation. Except for the initial state branch in
the home state, all forms of state and federally chartered foreign
bank entities are now obligated to satisfy one or more requirements
of the IBA before they commence operations. There is no time to go
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into all of those now, but Neal Petersen is going to touch on some
of them later [4]. For example, a federal branch or agency of a
foreign bank must not be prohibited by state law and it must be
approved by the Comptroller.
In addition, in acting on an application to establish a federal
branch or agency, the Comptroller must consider the financial and
managerial resources and future prospects of the applicant and, in
language giving the Comptroller rather broad discretion, the IBA re-
quires the Comptroller to consider the effect of the proposal on
expansion of competition in the U.S. and in foreign commerce. That
is a rather strange provision and we will discuss the antitrust
issues a bit later [5].
(iii) Types of offices
I will conclude this part of my remarks by summarizing the
different types of offices maintained in the U.S. by foreign banks:
(1) REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES - 249
These offices must file a report with the Treasury Department
and, as far as I know, nothing much more happens with those reports
once filed. 192 banks from 48 foreign countries were represented
by these offices in 1980.
(2) COMMERCIAL LENDING COMPANIES - 6
These fit the description of the so-called Article 12 New York
investment companies.
(3) STATE CHARTERED AGENCIES - 171
(4) FEDERALLY CHARTERED AGENCIES - 5
Applications for three additional agencies are pending.
(5) EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS - 16
There are 121 foreign and domestically controlled Edge Act
corporations with 66 branches. Foreign banking organizations have
invested in only 16 of these, and one of the 16 presently has a
branch.
(6) STATE CHARTERED BRANCH WITH LIMITED DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS
(7) FEDERALLY CHARTERED BRANCH WITH LIMITED DEPOSIT-TAKING
POWERS D 142
(8) STATE CHARTERED BRANCH WITH FULL DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS
(9) FEDERALLY CHARTERED BRANCH WITH FULL DEPOSIT-TAKING POWERS - 12
(I0)SUBSIDIARIES - 42
A number of these represent acquisitions of existing U.S. banks.
This summary indicates that foreign banks have not yet taken
significant advantage of the federal option in branching, nor have
they taken advantage of the ability to branch Edge Act companies
that they now, or may in the future, own.
Before closing, I want to remind you of the substantial amount
of literature which has been growing in this area. A bibliography is
appended at the end of the chapter. I particularly recommend the
Fed's 1980 study of the first years of operatinq under the IBA.
(iv) Edge Act branches
I will end my comments at this point with an option that is
available to an international bank and is, I think, the wave of the
future: that is, the Edge Act route for foreign bank expansion.
The IBA amended the Edge Act by eliminating the requirement that the
directors of Edge Act corporations must be citizens of the U.S. It
also provides that the foreign bank may, with prior Fed approval,
own a majority of the shares of such corporation. I do not want to
sound like a law professor here, but an Edge Act corporation is a
rare and wondrous thing. There are three kinds of powers it has.
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One would be what I have described as general banking powers.
Those are enumerated in the Edge Act, and they run a page and a half
or so. Edge Act corporations can purchase and sell securities,
accept bills and drafts, issue letters of credit, and engage in a
wide variety of finance transactions. The second kind of power they
have--and again this creates a significant advantage over domestic
banks--is the power to purchase stock in other corporations, some-
thing which is very restricted for domestic banks. Last--and this
is a new power that all Edge Act corporations were given by the IBA--
they can branch anywhere that the Fed allows. Prior to the IBA, a
domestically-owned Edge Act corporation could not branch. By amend-
ing the Edge Act to provide for foreign bank ownership, the IBA
extended this new entry option by allowing for branches. Although
I predict that there will be significant litigation, I believe it
will come to pass that the Edge Act entry option will be the most
expeditious way to penetrate U.S. banking markets.
(v) Obstacles to Edge Act branching
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal Petersen, has the red interposed any
obstacles to the Edge Act branching of foreign banks?
MR. PETERSEN: We have not interposed any objections in that
area. I do not think we have seen any instances yet of foreign Edge
Act branching. Most of the branching has involved the conversion
of existing domestic Edge Act subsidiaries into a branch structure.
Large banks had established a number of Edge Act subsidiaries around
the country as separate corporations; and with the change in the
Federal Reserve regulations, many of those subsidiaries were con-
verted to branches. There is nothing in the IBA that deals directly
with branching; however, we felt that the general purposes of the
Edge Act provisions and the IBA amendments to the Edge Act gave us
the authority, which we had not previously decided we had, to permit
branching.
As a result, there have been these conversions and mergers of
existing multicorporate Edge Act operations into branch structures.
These have been very routinely approved by the Board. I would ex-
pect that expansive branching by existing Edge Act corporations--
including foreign owned Edge Act corporations--would not receive
any particular objections from the Federal Reserve. I would caution
you, though, that as this trend continues, and if it develops to the
degree that Dennis Lehr suggests, there may well be some challenge
to our interpretation that branching is permitted under the Edge Act
as it was amended by the IBA. I think that issue still lingers. It
will be a particularly troublesome issue if the Board ever adopts
a version of the so-called qualified business entity concept.
In regard to qualified business entities, you may recall that
the staff suggested that the Board propose a new creature by that
name, for which an Edge Act corporation could provide a full range
of banking services including full lending and deposit-taking powers.
The test proposed at the time--about a year or so ago--was that the
qualified business entity, on an unconsolidated basis, must base
two-thirds of its business on sales or purchases from international
business. There were various other tests proposed that would measure
the qualifying "international business". This particular proposal
was not acted upon by the Board when it adopted the branching regu-
lations, because of the political fire storm in opposition that
appeared to be developing among various state regulators and regional
banks.
This concept has not gone away. The staff may well come back
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to the Board in the near future with another attempt at redefining
the idea of qualified business entity--maybe in a somewhat different
fashion. If the Board adopts the concept, its implementation will
considerably expand the ability of Edge Act corporations to do a
full range of banking services, although to a rather discrete type
of customer. Nevertheless, this might be perceived as a significant
breach of the spirit of the McFadden Act--not necessarily the letter
of the McFadden Act--and I would expect we would find much political
and judicial effort to prevent it.
2. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN BANKS
MR. MAC RAE: Now that Dennis Lehr has focussed on the attrac-
tive options that are available to foreign banks, I am going to
perform the typical lawyer's job of giving you the bad news and focus
on some of the more important restrictions that are applicable to
foreign banks. In so doing, I am going to try to give you a picture
of the complex "banking landscape" that we now have in the U.S. as
a result of the IBA.
A. Restrictions on Entry
First, let us examine the interstate banking restrictions.
Dennis has told you briefly about the McFadden Act [6], which limits
branching across state lines, and the so-called Douglas amendment
(71, which limits interstate acquisitions by holding companies.
In essence, the IBA made these same general restrictions appli-
cable to foreign banks--but it did so with a few "twists" and com-
promises. As a result, subject to a few important exceptions, a
foreign bank is now prohibited from maintaining a branch outside
something called its "home state". (I will tell you a little more
about home state later.) Similarly, a foreign bank is now generally
prohibited from acquiring another bank outside its home state (8].
But as I noted, there were some important exceptions that were made
available to foreign banks.
(i) Exceptions to the general rule
The first major exception for foreign banks was the so-called
grandfathering rule, which allowed a foreign bank to continue to
operate any branch or banking subsidiary that had commenced operation
(or had been applied for) on or before July 27, 1978, even though
the office was outside its home state. This meant that a bank that
had moved fast could have kept offices in, say, four or five states,
if they had at least been applied for prior to the grandfathering
date.
A second group of exceptions made it clear that the foreign
bank could still establish other offices outside its home state, pro-
vided they eschewed the taking of domestic deposits. Thus, a pleth-
ora of interstate agencies or so-called limited branches could
theoretically be permitted. (And note that the IBA actually expanded
upon the practical availability of such options, because it opened
the way for obtaining a federal license for agencies and limited
branches.)
(ii) Home state rules
obviously, the determination of a foreign bank's home state is
a crucial linch-pin to the operation of the interstate banking re-
strictions. How then does a foreign bank go about selecting its
home state? Does it just hang out a sign saying this is "home sweet
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home"? Well, it is pretty close to that.
The Federal Reserve Board issued its definitive regulations
in October of 1980, instructing banks how to go about selecting their
home state [9]. Incidentally, the foreign banks that now have multi-
state operations had until March 31, 1981, to select their home
state, and there were some fascinating deliberations going on among
certain institutions as to which state to select. Let me just quick-
ly give you some highlights of the home state selection regulation.
First, as I said, a bank can select its own home state; but
if a bank does not select it, then the Federal Reserve will gracious-
ly select it for the bank. The regulation also permits a bank to
change its home state once, but only once. This restriction was not
specifically contained in the IBA, but it was probably necessary to
prevent possible abuses of the home state concept. Obviously, if a
bank has just one branch in one state, then that has got to be its
home state. But the real fascination occurs in the case of a bank
that had offices as of July 27, 1978, in a number of states. Such a
bank may have some very tough decisions in choosing its home state.
Let me take an example. Let us say a bank had a branch in
New York and an agency in another state, such as California [10].
Under the home state rules, if the bank were to designate the state
in which its agency was located as its home state, then suddenly it
would be able to expand the powers of that agency into a full depo-
sit-taking branch and still keep its original grandfathered branch
in New York. So you could get two branches for the price of one.
Now, it would get a bit more complicated if the bank later
wished to change its selection. Let us say, after selecting Cali-
fornia as the home state, a year later the bank wanted to acquire
another bank located in New York. In such event, the bank would be
permitted to switch its home state to New York; but it would have
to give up its domestic deposit-taking powers in California, there-
by reverting to an agency status in that state.
(Iii) Three sets of rules
I am not going to spend any more time on these rules because
they can get very complicated, particularly in the acquisition area.
But I did want to tell you about them to illustrate that there are
now really three sets of principles applicable to banks in the U.S.
in the interstate area. First, there are the rules that apply to
domestic U.S. banks. Second, there are the rules that are applicable
to foreign banks that do not have any grandfathered branches (but
are still allowed out-of-state agencies and limited branches). And
third, there are the rules applicable to those lucky foreign banks
that have grandfathered facilities [11]. Thus, it is true that the
"playing field", if you will, has become a good deal more level,
but there are still some interesting variations in the terrain.
B. Non-banking Activities
I now want to move from the pure banking area, and turn to the
question of non-banking entry in the U.S. This is actually a very
important area for foreign banks, because foreign banks quite typi-
cally have a lot broader powers and non-banking operations than
American banks. They quite often engage in underwriting and distri-
bution of securities, and indeed they often have manufacturing and
industrial affiliates. in theory, the IBA attempted to apply to for-
eign banks the same types of general restrictions against non-bank-
ing entry that were previously applicable to domestic banks under
[2081
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the Bank Holding Company Act [121. Just as in the interstate bank-
ing area, they did so with some compromises.
(i) Securities
Let us take underwriting and dealing in securities. At present,
the well-known Glass-Steagall Act [131 severely limits domestic banks'
activities in that area. But if a foreign bank had an underwriting
and securities affiliate established and operating on or prior to
July 26, 1978, then it would be entitled to keep that affiliate. On
the opposite side of the coin, if a foreign bank today had any ideas
about setting up or acquiring a securities affiliate, 1 am sure Neal
Petersen would quickly tell them that that is now flatly prohibited
by the IBA. In short, with the exception of grandfathered securities
operations, foreign banks are now covered by essentially the same
restrictions on securities activities as domestic banks.
(ii) Manufacturing
The situation gets a bit more complex when one examines the
status of manufacturing or industrial subsidiaries or affiliates of
foreign banks. Let us take the case of a shoe manufacturing company.
I am sure everyone in the audience is saying, "If you cannot have an
underwriting affiliate in the U.S., certainly no foreign bank could
ever have a shoe manufacturing affiliate here." Well, that is not
true. The foreign bank may well be able to do just that. Under the
provisions of Regulation K [14] of the Federal Reserve Board--which
were quite recently promulgated and which interpret related provi-
sions of the IBA--there are ways in which a foreign bank could be
permitted to have a shoe manufacturing or other clearly non-banking
subsidiary in the U.S. Briefly, assuming the foreign bank (and any
parent holding company) qualifies for the exemptions provided in
Regulation K, then either it (or any parent company) could have a
foreign subsidiary which directly or indirectly engages in a non-
banking activity here, provided that (1) more than fifty percent of the
foreign subsidiary's consolidated assets and revenues are located in
or derived from outside the U.S. and (2) the proposed activities in
the U.S. are the same kind of activities as the foreign subsidiary
conducts abroad. Thus, to return to our hypothetical example, a
qualifying foreign bank would be permitted to let one of its foreign
subsidiaries or affiliates in the shoe manufacturing business open
up or acquire a slightly smaller shoe manufacturing operation in the
U.S. (151.
(iii) Compromises
What I am trying to illustrate here is that the rules we now
have were based on some compromises that the draftsmen of the Act and
the regulators have had to make, to take into account some existing
facts that they really could not do much about. For example, one of
those facts was that at the time of the passage of the IBA a number
of foreign banks already had in place in the U.S. facilities that
would not have been permitted to domestic banks under the Glass-
Steagall Act. Another fact of life was the significant non-banking
affiliations of a number of foreign banks.
I actually think the compromises that have been developed were
fairly enlightened, given the existing landscape the legislators and
regulators had to work with. But, just as in the interstate banking
area, one is left asking some basic questions about the underlying
restrictions that exist in our banking system. Put another way, the
interstate and non-banking activities restrictions contained in the
IBA have considerably leveled the playing field on which foreign and
domestic banks now compete; but at the same time, the field is not
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entirely level. One is thus left with the nagging question whether
the American system of restrictions, or playing field if you will,
is outdated in today's world of universal banks.
C. Dual Banking System Problems
Now I will not succeed in my goal of thoroughly confusing you
if I do not touch on one other complication for entry of foreign
banks in the U.S., which is caused by the fact that there is a dual
banking system in the U.S. Prior to 1978, foreign banks could open
a branch or agency only pursuant to a state license [16]; thus,
they were mainly exposed to only one side of our dual banking system.
However, since the enactment of the IBA, foreign banks now have the
option to seek either a federal or state license for a branch or
agency. This has exacerbated certain tensions that already existed
in the dual banking system.
Some of these tensions have been healthy. Thus, there has been
a certain amount of competition between the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and certain state regulatory agencies to provide more options
and powers for the banks that are licensed by them, in an effort to
make their respective licenses more attractive.
For example, to compete against the fact that some perceive
federal branches and agencies as being more attractive, the New York
State Banking Department has spearheaded a legislative and regulatory
revision to permit New York State licensed agencies to issue "large
denomination obligations" that in essence are certificates of deposit
[17].
At other times this competition between regulatory agencies
might not prove to be so healthy, as there has been a bit of compe-
tition to eliminate certain protective requirements that were pre-
viously applicable to the foreign banks. For example, the Comptrol-
ler did not impose a so-called maintenance of assets requirement upon
federally licensed branches and agencies, which for a while stood in
contrast to New York's former requirement that foreign branches main-
tain a margin of 108 percent assets to liabilities. In response, the New
York Superintendent of Banks sought legislation, and implemented
regulations, to permit a relaxation of New York's requirement [18].
Finally, the competition within the system of dual banking
regulation of foreign banks has even resulted in some genteel mud-
slinging between the federal and state regulatory agencies. The New
York Superintendent of Banks and the Conference of State Banking
Supervisors had noted with some alarm that the Comptroller of the
Currency was permitting federal branches and agencies to do a few
things that state branches and agencies could not do.
For example, federal agencies were permitted under the Comptrol-
ler's regulations to take deposits from non-U.S. citizens [19]; in
contrast, neither domestic nor foreign deposits are permitted at most
state agencies. Similarly, certain foreign banks that were previously
foreclosed from obtaining a state license, because their home country
lacked so-called banking reciprocity [20], were permitted to obtain
a federal branch, under the Comptroller's interpretation of his au-
thority under the IBA.
As a result of this dichotomy, the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors and the Attorney General of New York brought a lawsuit
against the Comptroller challenging certain of the regulations that
the Comptroller had issued [21]. It is hard to predict how the ac-
tion will turn out. But the ultimate decision will turn on the in-
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terpretation of a very few possibly ambiguous phrases in the IBA.
Thus, for example, the issue of the reciprocity requirement will
primarily turn on whether the language that authorizes the Comptrol-
ler to license a branch in any state where the establishment of a
branch "is not prohibited by State law" [22] bars a federal branch
only in a state where there exists a flat prohibition against branch-
ing, as opposed to a statement of state criteria for an acceptable
foreign bank branch.
3. DIRECT ACQUISITION OF EXISTING BANKS
At this point we are running short on time, and I wish to leave
some time for Dennis Lehr to address perhaps the most controversial
area of foreign bank entry--that is, direct acquisition of existing
U.S. banks. I would only note, by way of introduction to this sub-
ject, that this is the area where the advantages of foreign banks are
perceived (and I believe rightly so) to be the most significant at
the present time.
MR. LEHR: I am going to skip most of the statistics on foreign
bank ownership. These are readily available in the Comptroller of
the Currency's studies listed in the bibliography. But for those
who cannot resist some statistics, let me just point out that of the
three hundred largest U.S. banks, only twenty-six are foreign owned,
and that includes foreign banking organizations or individuals. Un-
fortunately, the meaning of "ownership" is not agreed on in the dif-
ferent government reports. One government study uses a ten percent
ownership test and thus, if a foreigner owns ten percent of the
stock, that study includes a hundred percent of the bank's assets as
"foreign owned".
A. Antitrust Law in Banking
I have been asked to say something about antitrust law. This
area of the law presents many issues that lawyers get excited about.
In the banking context, antitrust prohibitions generally prevent one
banking organization from acquiring another, because after the acqui-
sition the combined entity will be too big--that is, it will reduce
competition in the market. Just where is, and what is, the relevant
market in any proposed combination leads to a lot of legal business.
In talking about competition in a market, we often find our-
selves in a kind of numbers game. We talk about dominated markets,
and controlled markets, and elimination of actual and potential com-
petitors. There are certain assumptions built into our antitrust
law which generally favor more, rather than fewer, competitive units.
Ultimately, these laws are supposedly applied for the benefit of the
consumers of the services of whatever business is expanding. In our
case, that would be just the everyday bank customers.
(i) Anti-competitive effects
In the context of foreign bank expansion in this country, I
believe our antitrust laws can be viewed from two perspectives.
I have considered what the federal regulators have done with respect
to the antitrust criteria that they are supposed to apply; and I
have tried to ascertain what standards they may apply in the future.
First, I will briefly summarize what the federal agency decisions
have shown in the last few years.
Recent decisions have revealed that anti-competitive effects
were of significant concern to the federal agencies in only a very
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small number of acquisition cases. As an example, we shall look at
the Fed's opinion approving the acquisition of Union Bank in Cali-
fornia by Standard Chartered of London. The opinion, I think, is
worthy of examination for the manner in which it seems to downplay
the anti-competitive effects of the transaction and its emphasis on
the pro-competitive effects. I am personally in sympathy with this
approach.
At the time Standard Chartered sought to acquire Union, Union
was the sixth largest banking organization in California. Califor-
nia has some very large banks, including Bank of America. Standard
Chartered of London had a subsidiary located in San Francisco, and
that subsidiary was the twenty-first largest bank in the state.
The impact of the transaction on actual competition, according to
the Fed, was limited to only three markets. One of the primary rea-
sons that the Fed concluded that the effect of the transaction on
existing competition in those markets was only "slightly adverse"
was because Union Bank was a relatively small competitor compared
to the largest banks in those markets. I fully agree.
However, those who oppose this view would say that in one of
the three markets--in particular, the most significant market in the
state (the Los Angeles metropolitan area)--Union Bank was the fourth
largest bank. As the fourth largest bank in that market, it, to-
gether with the three other largest banks, controlled seventy-one
percent of all deposits; that is, the four banks out of one hundred
and five in that market had seventy-one percent of the deposits.
Had this been a domestic acquisition within the state, the Fed's
decision, I believe, would have come out the other way. The Fed did
not believe there was any direct impact on potential competition.
Rather, it placed great significance on the pro-competitive aspects
of the acquisition, with particular emphasis on the representation
by Standard Chartered that it would provide Union with twenty-five
million dollars in new capital.
Here, again, was a situation that banking lawyers find quite
anomalous. Union was a bank in a weak capital condition. Yet be-
cause of our domestic antitrust laws, no eligible U.S. bank large
enough to supply the needed capital could acquire it; thus, Union
had to look out of state for help. I hope Bob Carswell later will
comment on the prospects for some loosening of those restrictions
[23].
(ii) Future trends
In short, my review of foreign acquisition decisions shows that
the federal regulators have not, to date, been significantly troubled
by the anti-competitive effects of foreign acquisitions. But what of
the future? Pressures have now been exerted on the federal agencies
by some members of Congress to consider the worldwide effect as well
as domestic competitive effects of U.S. bank acquisitions by foreign
banking organizations.
This is significant because the authority under which the do-
mestic banking agencies approve these acquisitions clearly says that
they should look only to domestic markets. The Bank Holding Company
Act and the Bank Merger Act, both direct the federal agencies to
consider competitive effects in any section of the "country", mean-
ing the U.S.; and it has been the practice of the agencies to limit
their review accordingly. Perhaps the economists at the Board and
elsewhere, for one reason or another, sometimes gratuitously mention
the effects on commerce outside the U.S. Correct me if I am wrong,
Neal, but I think in the acquisitions of Marine Midland and National
Bank of North America, the Fed made reference to the effects of the
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acquisition on international markets. To date, however, no federal
agency has denied a bank acquisition based on international market
considerations. As I indicated, my own view is that our federal
regulators should continue to look at our own domestic markets, to
which the statutes under which they operate direct them.
I find support for this view in a recent decision--handed down
on February 20, 1981, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit [241--involving National Bank of Canada's loss of its Master
Charge business, allegedly through a Sherman Act violation by an
American financial institution. The violation of our antitrust laws,
it was alleged, occurred outside of the U.S. In the last sentence
of the opinion, the court said that "anti-competitive effect upon
U.S. commerce" must either occur within the U.S. or affect export
commerce from the U.S. Thus, I think it is irrelevant, and I hope
it will remain so, whether Standard Chartered or any other foreign
bank should choose to monopolize the markets in Indonesia, in Sri
Lanka, or anywhere else. Our regulators should just confine them-
selves to the U.S. markets.
B. Acquisition Techniques
MR. MUNDHEIM: Laying aside antitrust problems, suppose a for-
eign bank has a branch in New York and it would like to acquire a
bank in Atlanta. It has operated that New York branch since 1970.
Any problem with that?
MR. LEHR: No, because that branch is grandfathered. When I
say no, I am not current on Georgia law, but I am assuming Georgia
law does not prohibit foreign bank ownership. The foreign bank could
then acquire a bank in Georgia.
MR. MUNDHEIM: And make that its home state?
MR. LEHR: That is correct.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Now suppose that in addition to that New York
branch, a subsidiary of the foreign bank also had securities activi-
ties in the U.S. The foreign bank now acquires the Georgia bank.
You have said that it can continue to operate the New York branch and
the new Georgia bank that it acquired. Must it dispose of its secu-
rities business?
MR. LEHR: My understanding is that those securities affiliates
were also grandfathered if they were operating as of July 1978.
MR. PETERSEN: That is a correct interpretation only if the
Georgia operation is a branch or agency.
MR. MUNDHEIM: If the Georgia bank becomes a subsidiary of the
foreign bank, would there be Bank Holding Company Act problems?
Could you rely on the IBA grandfathering provisions to help solve
the Holding Company Act difficulty?
MR. LEHR: Bob, a banking lawyer would advise you to do the
transaction as a purchase of assets and assumption of liabilities,
and to go in as a full deposit-taking branch. Then you could keep
all three operations going and you would not have the Bank Holding
Company Act problem. You would get the benefit of the grandfathered
branch and the securities company in New York.
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C. Controlling Foreign Acquisitions
MR. PETERSEN: I have a comment regarding a couple of things
that Dennis Lehr and Cameron MacRae mentioned with respect to entry
alternatives. Dennis was very bullish on the Edge Act as a tech-
nique for foreign bank entry. I think I would agree with him in
terms of the future prospects for Edge Act activities.
(i) Edge Act corporations
There is an additional advantage for Edge Act corporations
which so far the Board has not taken away. Entry by way of an Edge
Act subsidiary would not make the foreign banking organization sub-
ject to the various non-banking prohibitions of the Bank Holding
Company Act, as would be the case if the foreign bank came in by way
of a branch or a direct subsidiary. When the Board originally pro-
posed its Edge Act revisions in 1979, it would have required conform-
ity to the non-bank restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act for
any Edge Act subsidiary. Questions were raised about whether the
Fed had authority to do that, and ultimately the Fed backed off.
We still think we have the authority to review any such activities
if they are inconsistent with the purposes of the Federal Reserve
Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. But at the moment, there is a
theoretical advantage (perhaps a real one if you do not push it too
far) with respect to non-bank activities if you come in by way of an
Edge Act corporation.
(1i) Non-banking activities
Another word about non-bank activities. In some instances a
foreign bank holding company can have an ice cream manufacturing or
shoe manufacturing company subsidiary but cannot have a subsidiary
in a closely related financial field. That is anomalous. There is
a provision in section 8 of the IBA which provides that if the for-
eign bank wants to engage in an activity that is of a financial
nature or closely related to banking under Section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (governing permissible non-banking activi-
ties for bank holding companies), the foreign bank holding company
must make an application to the Federal Reserve. In that case, the
holding company does not get the benefit of the automatic ice cream
parlor exception.
The Board took the position that the statute meant that an
application is required not only if the activity is already on the
so-called laundry list (such as mortgage banking), but also if it
is generally within Division H of the standard Industrial Classifi-
cation Code (covering, generally, financial activities). The purpose
was to avoid permitting foreign banks to gain a competitive advantage
in providing financial services in the U.S.
The clearest example is an insurance activity that is not on
the 4(c) (8) laundry list, but which, if conducted by a foreign bank,
might give it a considerable advantage in competing with U.S. banks.
On the other hand, if the foreign bank had an ice cream parlor, it
would not, presumably, have any great competitive advantage over U.S.
banks. This is an example of the push-pull between the need to un-
derstand domestic concerns and the desire not to discourage foreign
bank entry into the U.S.
D. Objections to Foreign Acquisitions
MR. MUNDHEIM: When the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank sought to
acquire Marine Midland, a good deal of unfavorable publicity was gen-
erated, and one question raised was whether as a matter of policy it
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is undesirable to permit foreign acquisition of substantial U.S.
banks. The recent speculation about the acquisition of a major bank
on Long Island by a foreign bank has re-ignited that question. Fred
Heldring, what do you think about allowing foreign banks to make
acquisitions of substantial U.S. banks?
MR. HELDRING: Well, there are in my mind two issues. I go on
the assumption that no country likes--to put it in an extreme--to
have one hundred percent of its banking system owned by foreigners,
and that would include the U.S. So the question arises, what is
enough? Perhaps we have reached that point. A little clarity on
that subject would be helpful.
The second point I would like to make--which has not been dis-
cussed as much--concerns the impact upon individual communities of
acquisitions in the private sector generally and in banking in par-
ticular. The life of a community is dependent to a large extent upon
a healthy, and sound, and independent private sector. In that kind
of private sector an independent banking system plays quite an im-
portant role. To the extent that communities become branch towns or
subsidiary towns, this health and soundness of the community is en-
dangered, and we see the results of this in some cases.
I think these two questions arise when you think of the Long
Island case. it is not just because a foreign bank is involved; the
same situation would exist if any other bank acquired that particu-
lar bank on Long Island. There may not be much left on Long Island
in terms of independent banking, and that raises a question as to
what it does to a community.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Perhaps our German colleague, Professor Fritz
Kiibler, has a comment on that point of view.
MR. KUBLER: I feel that this point is particularly interesting;
and I am sure that my countrymen would be unhappy if even less than
one hundred percent of the German banks were taken over by American
banks. It might cause some uneasiness if, for instance, the Deutche
Bank were taken over.
Concerning local communities, it occurs to me that the question
is one of structure. We have been safe, but largely because the local
banks tend to be cooperatives or savings banks, which are organized
under public law. It might be possible to take over a savings bank,
but it is technically and legally so complicated that it just has not
been done so far. The question that arises for me is whether this is
primarily a structural problem, so that you need do no more than keep
banks reasonably small in the local community. Or, are banks some-
what different from normal businesses so that, because they are per-
forming a public service, they should be under some form of special
regulation as far as foreign acquisitions are concerned? I would
like to give that question back to the panel.
MR. VAGLIANO: I think the question is basically one of the
validity or non-validity of local control. Therefore the problem is
not really foreign versus American: it is actually not a foreign
bank problem. It is a question of the structure of the banking sys-
tem here, and whether the local communities benefit more or less
from local control. Of course, that is a terribly long argument.
I think there can be a political reaction in this country if
it is perceived more and more that foreign banks have special ad-
vantages. The IBA has, in a sense, attempted to bring greater clari-
ty and greater uniformity. Still, there are real advantages in terms
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of functions (either because of grandfathering, or because of the
law and the interpretations that may follow from the law, or because
of antitrust regulation) and because of the fact that reciprocity is
not really part of this whole concept. So I can foresee, and this
might particularly happen if a very large bank were acquired by for-
eign interests, that this entire subject could be reopened politi-
cally.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Neal, you had a comment?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes. In a number of Board orders approving
major foreign acquisitions, there have been rhetorical--I guess I
would put it--statements raising concerns about the market share of
foreign organizations in a particular market. However, those state-
ments have not necessarily been a factor in any decision one way or
the other. Under the present Bank Holding Company Act there are real
questions as to whether the degree of foreign market share per se
necessarily gives the Board any basis for denial.
There is an argument, I suppose, that the so-called conveni-
ence and needs tests under section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act
could be stretched a bit to cover the problem, particularly if a
record could be developed to show that, indeed, the local market
would not be adequately served because of excessive foreign ownership.
On that point, however, the studies done to date (for example, the
General Accounting Office report and our own report on foreign bank-
ing in the U.S.) have indicated that there has been no real walking
away from local markets after foreign banks have come in. Indeed,
the evidence seems to suggest the contrary. Having said all that,
I would certainly agree with the comment that this is a political
hot potato.
There have already been a number of hearings in the Congress
of the U.S. on this subject, and there have been proposals floated
that would change the test for acquisition of banks by ban: holding
companies, both foreign and domestic holding companies. Anything
that might be adopted to change tests under the Bank Holding Company
Act, which would go beyond the present antitrust concerns and the
existing convenience and needs test, may well end up being applied
across the board to both foreign and domestic companies.
One proposal was to apply what we call a public benefits test
to either foreign bank acquisitions or--more likely--any bank acqui-
sition over a certain size. The test would be very similar in con-
cept to the so-called benefits test under section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act, having to do with non-banking activities.
The test basically says, if there are any adverse effects as defined
in the statute (such as undue concentration of resources, unfair
competition, etc.) they would have to be outweighed by some public
benefit. On the other hand, if there are no adverse effects, we
interpret section 4(c) (8) to say you do not have to have a positive
public benefit. That test might be modified to require demonstration
of a positive public benefit.
There have also been some who propose an automatic cut-off if
a market share gets over a particular size in the hands of foreign
banking organizations. That would be very difficult to apply admin-
istratively and could cause some very serious problems with our
friends overseas in terms of possible retaliation. This concept is
similar to Senator Proxmire's Competition In Banking Act (which he
introduces in every Congress) which would put a limit on an acquirer
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if it would control more than a certain percentage of the deposits
in a particular state.
I think that this subject will continue to be before the
Congress notwithstanding a change in the leadership of the Congress
or a change in the Administration. Senator Heinz--who is a Republi-
can--is very, very concerned in this area. Representative Rosenthal
and Representative St. Germain on the House side--who are Democrats
--are also very concerned. So, I do not think it is a partisan
political issue; but it is a very, very important issue for many
members of Congress, in terms of the particular banking structure
in their district and, indeed, in the country. I would say the
Board has no pending proposals under consideration to make any of
these changes. I am just mentioning that these are the kinds of
ideas that have been suggested both by members of Congress and, in-
formally, by some regulators.
MR. MUNDHEIM: Fred, one minute for a final comment on this
issue.
MR. HELDRING: Right. I certainly do not want to pursue it
any further, but I want to clarify the point I made on the sound-
ness of the community. Admittedly, what I am saying applies to all
acquisitions and not only to acquisitions by foreigners. When you
have an independent local company, it will make contributions, both
in talent and in money, to vital non-profit activities in the com-
munity. As soon as that company is taken over, both organizational
and financial aid ceases. At the present time there are many com-
munities where it is mainly the bankers and lawyers who are still
involved in these kinds of effort. Now, if the bankers get acquired
and lose their independence, that may be rather serious for some of
these communities.
MR. LEHR: I want to note my deep disagreement with Fred
Heldring.
MR. MUNDHEIM: I think we should recognize that there are two
sides to this debate and we could argue the merits at length. But
we must turn to our next topic.
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